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1. Introduction 
The economic crisis of 2008 and beyond occurred at a time during which 
the old neoclassical dominance was giving way to a pluralism of different 
research programs within economics. At the same time, the financial sys-
tem that came tumbling down was based on neoclassical economics and 
its assumption of rational individual behavior and market discipline. In 
particular, the financial crisis was a direct consequence of the deregulation 
of financial markets that was urged by the neoclassical economic advo-
cates of efficient markets (e.g. Schwartz, 2009, Kessler, 2010, Bresser-
Pereira, 2010). For instance, Alan Greenspan, the former Chairman of the 
US Federal Reserve Board, noted in retrospect that ‘I have made the error 
to expect that the self-interest of organizations, especially banks and oth-
ers, was the best way to protect shareholders, capital, and business’ 
(Greenspan, quoted in De Graaf, 2010, p.49). As such, the economic crisis 
also is a crisis of neoclassical economics, thus providing an extra impetus 
to the new research programs waiting in the wings.  
Neoclassical economics is based on the so-called holy trinity of greed, self-
interest, and equilibrium (Colander, Holt, and Rosser, 2004). Indeed, greed 
and the pursuit of self-interest are powerful human motivators. Adam 
Smith, the founder of economic science, however, argued in the eight-
eenth century that these human motives are not always morally objec-
tionable. After all, they are the engine of the market while they were pre-
sumed to be kept in check by the market (Smith, 2003). 
After a time, however, cracks appeared in this economic bastion. For in-
stance, a series of simple illustrations showed that self-interest and social 
welfare do not always go together. For example, it would be better if we 
did not have to have insurance against theft, required no safes and alarm 
systems. Unfortunately, however, they are needed to protect us against 
the greed of others. In addition, there are negative externalities — an ac-
tion of an economic actor comes at the expense of another without the 
latter being compensated – and it is debatable whether social welfare is 
served by the highest possible growth. Indeed, present climate and envi-
ronmental problems demonstrate the importance of uncontrolled exter-
nalities. 
The credit crisis has subsequently beaten gaping holes in the neoclassical 
economics bastion. For instance, although self-interest and greed are the 
engine of the market system, the credit crisis once again made clear that 
the market system equally depends on institutions which constrain and 
control its counter-productive effects. The market institutions have 
proven unable to suitably discipline powerful human motivations. This 
raises the question concerning the future of economics, not only of the 
institutions of the economy, but also of the future of the economic disci-
pline. But before looking at the future, we will first revisit the past. 
The following section briefly sets out what neoclassical economics consists 
of, and how the new research programs have adapted it. We pay special 
attention to behavioral economics as one of the most prominent new 
programs. In the third section, we discuss which fault economists of dif-
ferent theoretical inclinations have observed to have caused the crisis, and 
which solutions they have advanced to solve it. In the final section, then, 
we propose what we believe is an example of a promising behavioral eco-
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nomic solution to help prevent future crises, the Default mortgage. The 
Default mortgage guards individuals against their bounded rationality 
while at the same time maintaining, if not enhancing, the welfare-
producing capacities of the market.  
 
2. From neoclassical dominance to pluralism 
In the decades following World War Two the economic discipline was 
characterized by the dominance of one research program: neoclassical 
economics (e.g. Colander, Holt, and Rosser, 2004, Davis, 2003, Sent 2006). 
At the core of neoclassical economics stood the rational, self-interested 
individual who maximized the satisfaction of her preferences given her 
budget and given the prices of all the commodities. In this view, the 
budget was broadly defined to include not only income and wealth, but 
also (spare) time and whichever other resource that could be traded. Simi-
larly, commodities included not only bread and bicycles, but also services, 
leisure, children, cultural identity and whatever else individuals could 
prefer to have or could prefer not to have (e.g. Wheelan, 2002). Because 
the individuals in the economy were on average rational in satisfying their 
preferences, the economy as a whole, i.e. the sum total of the individuals 
in the economy, would be in equilibrium. Equilibrium meant that the 
commodities had been distributed as efficiently as possible among the 
individuals in the economy given the individual preferences and budget 
constraints. 
Starting around 1980 the dominance of neoclassical economics gradually 
faded and a pluralism of new economic research programs emerged 
(Davis, forthcoming). Most of these new research programs, however, 
were adjustments of the neoclassical program rather than fundamental 
rejections of it. Evolutionary economists, for instance, argued among 
others – as the name suggests – that the economy should be seen as re-
sulting from a Darwinian process of selection in which the economy’s 
equilibrium is not a static, fixed set of prices and preferences, but the out-
come of a constantly changing environment (e.g. Nelson and Winter, 
1982, Groenewegen, Spithoven, and van den Berg, 2010). Experimental 
economists introduced the methodological novelty of market-
experiments and argued that the rational equilibrium does not immedi-
ately emerge, but that the economy needs time to evolve towards the 
most efficient set of preferences and prices because individuals need time 
to adjust their behavior (e.g. Smith, 2008, Plott and Smith, 2008, Heu-
kelom, forthcoming 2011). In addition, experimental economists argued 
that the eventual equilibrium depends not only on demand and supply, 
but also for example on the elasticity of demand and supply and the rela-
tive number of buyers and sellers (e.g Smith, 1982, Plott, 1982). Institu-
tional economists, for their part, emphasized how cultural specificities or 
institutions such as the law might constrain individuals to maximally 
satisfy their preferences, or on the contrary enable them to achieve a 
higher amount of welfare than would have been possible without those 
institutions (e.g. North, 2005, de Jong, 2009). 
One of the most prominent new economic research programs has been 
behavioral economics (see Heukelom, 2010 for an overview). Behavior as a 
concept encapsulating all acts of the human being – and, more controver-
sially, of the animal being – originates in the United States of the early 
twentieth century (Danziger, 1997). Subsequently, this new concept of 
behavior provided the basis for the label of the new approach to psychol-
ogy baptized behaviorism (Mills, 1998). Behaviorism in its strictest sense is 
a scientific program commenced and developed by John Broadus Watson, 
Burrhus Frederick Skinner and others, which reigned American psychol-
ogy in the 1920’s and 1930’s. In addition, behaviorism forms part of a 
broader characteristic of twentieth century American social science and 
society, namely to ‘think behavioristically’ (Mills, 1998, p.1, see also e.g. 
Ross, 1991). To think behavioristically is to equate ‘theory with applica-
tion, understanding with prediction, and the workings of the human 
mind with social technology’ (Mills, 1998, p.2). Although behavioral eco-
nomics does not directly relate to behaviorism, it is part of the twentieth 
century American focus on thinking behavioristically.  
It was after World War Two that behavior’s adverbial conjugation ‘behav-
ioral’ was introduced in relation to ‘science’ and ‘economics’. The usage of 
‘behavioral economics’ was initially popularized at the University of 
Michigan’s Survey Research Center in the late 1940’s, where George Ka-
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tona understood behavioral economics as investigating economic behav-
ior, that is the sub-class of behavior produced in the course of the agent’s 
activities in the economy (e.g. Festinger and Katz, 1953, Juster, 2004). 
Other users of the adverb ‘behavioral’ included Ward Edwards, also at the 
University of Michigan, who, starting in the late 1950’s, employed it as the 
name of his branch of operations research called behavioral decision re-
search (Edwards, 1954, 1961); and Herbert Simon, who from the late 1950’s 
advanced what he labeled behavioral economics as an alternative to the 
dominant neoclassical school in economics (Simon, 1959, 1987). The label 
of behavioral economics was later picked up by economists who sought to 
reform the dominant neoclassical view of the day along the lines set out 
by Simon, establishing a to this day thriving, albeit non-mainstream eco-
nomic research program. During the early 1980’s, behavioral economics 
was furthermore claimed by the behavioral economics program of the 
Alfred P. Sloan and Russell Sage Foundations. Individuals involved in this 
program from the first hour included Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman, 
Richard Thaler, Robert Shiller, Lawrence Summers, and others. After a 
number of years in the margin of economics, this ‘new’ program of behav-
ioral economics (Sent, 2004) became influential in the 1990’s, and devel-
oped into one of the key contenders for replacing the no longer dominant 
neoclassical economic theory in the 2000’s – as exemplified among others 
by Kahneman’s Nobel memorial prize in economics in 2002 (Kahneman, 
2003). 
Observing these developments Abu Rizvi (1994b, p. 19n) noted that ‘It is 
interesting that Simon’s ideas were not used by mainstream theorists for 
years but have recently been “discovered”.’ And Herbert Simon (1992, p. 
266) observed: ‘Readers would not be deceived by the claim that econo-
mists flocked to the banner of satisficing man with his bounded rational-
ity. The “flocking” was for a long time a trickle that is now swelling into a 
respectable stream’. In fact, Simon (1991, p. 385) had earlier lamented: ‘My 
economist friends have long since given up on me, consigning me to psy-
chology or some other distant wasteland’. 
A central feature of behavioral economics has been its – to economists – 
new use of the term ‘normative’ and ‘descriptive’ (or ‘positive’). Norma-
tive has been defined ethically in economics at least since the publication 
of John Neville Keynes’ Scope and Method of Political Economy (1890). In 
the normative domain one discussed what was good, fair, just, or ethical 
in other ways (Hands, 2001, p.30). Positive first of all meant not value-
based, and secondly referred in a general sense to the empirical basis of a 
value-free science of economics. Behavioral economists, by contrast, in-
troduced to economists the definition of normative as used by behavioral 
decision researchers, mathematical psychologists, mathematicians, phi-
losophers and others, namely: normative as the rubric under which to 
discuss how one ought to behave if one wants to behave rationally. In 
addition, behavioral economists have claimed to be more empirically ori-
ented than neoclassical economists (e.g. Camerer and Loewenstein, 2004). 
In the early 2000’s, the concept of bounded rationality was adopted from 
Simon and together with the concept of full rationality was employed to 
rephrase Kahneman and Tversky’s normative–descriptive distinction. 
Gradually what was previously understood as the normative decision, 
now became the full rationality decision. Similarly, when the actual deci-
sion made by the individual deviated from the full rationality decision, it 
was now deemed boundedly rational instead of descriptive. In one clear 
sweep, Kahneman and Tversky’s distinction between the concepts of 
normative-descriptive was replaced by concepts more appropriate in an 
economic context, while at the same time Simon was appropriated as an 
authoritative source for the use of these concepts.  
During the same period, a distinction was drawn between the older and 
newer approaches to behavioral economics (Sent, 2004). In the 1960’s, ap-
peals to psychology on the part of behavioral economists were designed to 
develop an alternative to the mainstream model. Firmly rooted in its 
mathematical models, the mainstream exhibited little interest in these 
efforts. In the 1970’s, cognitive psychologists, as stated above, suggested 
ways to incorporate behavioral insights in ways that provided less of a 
threat to the standard model. At the same time, the mathematical foun-
dations of the mainstream started showing some flaws. In the 1980’s, dis-
agreements emerged between old and new behavioral economists, with 
the latter emerging as the victors in the 1990’s, partly because Simon 
abandoned his efforts and partly because new behavioral economists sug-
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gested ways in which their insights could be of help in rebuilding the 
mainstream stronghold. 
Returning to the early 2000’s, the normative-descriptive foundation of 
behavioral economics gave rise to a new perspective on welfare econom-
ics. For instance, behavioral economists discovered that people often save 
much less for their pensions than they should, and that when they do 
save, they do not diversify their portfolios optimally. Following on these 
results, programs have been set up to investigate how people can be in-
duced to save more for retirement and better diversify their stock portfo-
lios (e.g. Cronqvist and Thaler, 2004, Thaler and Benartzi, 2004). Another 
example concerns the use of medication. It has often been found that 
people who need to take drugs on a regular basis are very lax at doing so. 
Even when the risks are substantial and potential costs in terms of health 
very great, such as in the case of medication that reduces the chance of 
having a second stroke, people are very negligent at taking their medica-
tion properly. To solve this problem, programs have been set up that in-
vestigate how insights from behavioral economics can be used to design 
incentive mechanisms that induce people to take their medication (e.g. 
Badger et al., 2007). Finally, behavioral economists have turned their at-
tention to development economics, with the purpose of using insights 
from behavioral economics to improve the functioning of development 
programs. It is for instance suggested that being poor is cognitively more 
difficult than not being poor, because the poor individual constantly has 
to weigh pros and cons of possible expenditures. As a result, poor indi-
viduals may be more susceptible to misleading information and be less 
cognitively capable of making long term decisions, simply because of the 
fact of being poor (e.g. Betrand, Mullainathan and Shafir, forthcoming a, 
b). 
Behavioral economists have framed and defended this research in a num-
ber of closely related ways. Well-known is Thaler and Sunstein’s (2003) 
‘Libertarian Paternalism’, in 2008 followed up by Nudge, Improving Deci-
sions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). 
Libertarian paternalism can be understood as a paternalism that does not 
restrict individual freedom of choice. Thaler and Sunstein distinguished 
themselves explicitly from the traditional neoclassical stance towards wel-
fare issues. 
‘We clearly do not always equate revealed preference with welfare. That is, 
we emphasize the possibility that in some cases individuals make inferior 
choices, choices that they would change if they had complete informa-
tion, unlimited cognitive abilities, and no lack of willpower.’ (Thaler and 
Sunstein, 2003, p.175) 
In the behavioral economics paternalism debate, the justification for pa-
ternalistic policies has been the fact that decisions people actually make, 
their ‘revealed preferences,’ do not always match with their ‘true’ prefer-
ences. Behavioral economists have thus constructed a distinction between 
‘revealed’ and ‘true’ preferences. However, this does not mean that pref-
erences are context dependent. Rather, it means that it depends on the 
context and on the individual’s willpower whether the true preferences 
can and will be revealed appropriately.  
While behavioral economists were gaining prominence within the eco-
nomics profession, the same cannot be said for the policy arena. Relying 
on the outdated image of the decision maker as self-interested and greedy 
and the idea that markets would align these interests in such a way that 
general welfare would be enhanced, policy makers introduced market 
mechanisms in a whole range of areas, including health care, telephone 
communication, and postal services. And it was also on the basis of this 
holy trinity of self-interest, greed, and equilibrium that financial markets 
were liberalized. The devastating results became clear in the credit crisis 
that erupted in 2008. 
 
3. The economics of the crisis 
Let us give a very sketchy overview of the events that led up to the erup-
tion of the credit crisis. It all started in the American housing market. 
New forms of mortgages had been created, making it easier for people to 
qualify for a mortgage. With the rising housing prices, the idea was that it 
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had become less risky to give mortgages to people who could not afford 
them. After all, they could always refinance their mortgage based on the 
risen value of their home. These mortgages were labeled ‘subprime’ mort-
gages, because of the potential risks they carried, and are an illustration of 
a new technological and financial innovation. What made this innovation 
possible was the adjustable-rate mortgage, which allowed the home 
owner to choose among various monthly payment options, including the 
interest only option. This enabled more and more people to become 
home owners with mortgages whose risk was presumed to be reduced by 
the increasing housing prices. 
This trend did not limit itself to mortgages, but was extended to loans as 
well. Consumers were given the impression that they could borrow 
money ‘without costs’. These loans were called NINJA loans, with NINJA 
referring to ‘No Income, No Job, or Assets’. It is clear that people with a 
low credit rating qualified for these loans. The risks associated with these 
mortgages and loans spread throughout the financial markets. Again, 
new technological and financial innovations played a role. Issuers of the 
mortgages and loans resold them to investment banks on Wall Street. The 
growth in lending that accompanied this gave an incentive to the lenders 
to give out as many mortgages and loans as possible, in an effort to earn 
more money with the issuing of the mortgages and loans. Wall Street 
bundled and repackaged these mortgages and loans in new financial 
products, the so-called securitizations. 
The securitizations were subsequently resold as an investment opportu-
nity. Because the mortgages and loans had been divided and repackaged, it 
was difficult to determine the underlying value of the loans and mort-
gages. This in turn made it difficult to quantify the risks of the securitiza-
tions. At the same time, they were presumed to be profitable investment 
opportunities because of diversification concerns, which led to a growing 
popularity for securitizations. As a result, the risks of the underlying 
mortgages and loans were spread throughout the entire financial system. 
The whole financial system collapsed the moment interest rates started 
rising and housing prices started falling. People who were no longer able 
to pay their mortgages had to sell their homes. However, the falling hous-
ing prices no longer matched the size of the mortgages. Many home own-
ers went bankrupt and turned their homes over to the bank, which was 
then left with homes that could not be sold and mortgages that were not 
paid. This suddenly made it obvious that the value of bundled and repack-
aged mortgages was much lower than had previously been considered. 
This changed into a virus that spread throughout the financial system as a 
result of the securitizations. 
In an effort to halt the ‘subprime meltdown’ central banks pumped li-
quidity into the financial markets. The hope was that this would enable 
the mortgage issuers, banks, and hedge funds to continue their work. 
However, a snowball had been set into motion that turned into an ava-
lanche: the falling housing prices and growing numbers of people default-
ing on their mortgages led to bankruptcies in the financial system. As a 
result of the close ties within capital markets, the crisis quickly spread to 
Europe. Nobody knew which loans were toxic and which were not. No-
body wanted to lend money and encounter liquidity problems. A few 
financial institutions collapsed, and several were bailed out with govern-
ment support to prevent the financial system from imploding. 
The financial panic and constraints in turn led to a ‘great recession’ in the 
real economy, with many economies contracting at unprecedented speed 
(e.g. Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009, IMF, 2009). In response, many govern-
ments increased their spending in a classic Keynesian effort to prevent the 
great recession from turning into a new Great Depression. As a result, 
however, many governments started to run deficits that over the course 
of 2010 began to look increasingly unsustainable, at least as judged by the 
financial markets which by this time few economists still dared to call 
rational. 
The bounded rationality that is central to behavioral economics is key to 
the two main narratives concerning the cause of the crisis, namely faulty 
policy making and faulty markets. Let us address these in turn. 
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3.1 Policy makers and the crisis 
One set of arguments seeking to understand the onset of the crisis focuses 
on the bounded rationality of policy makers. In particular, their actions 
were myopic, focusing on the potential short-term gains, while neglecting 
the negative long-term repercussions. Jimmy Carter, Bill Clinton, and 
George W. Bush and their Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) stimu-
lated subprime mortgages. That is, the CRA was adopted under Jimmy 
Carter in 1977 and forced banks to provide mortgages to risky minority 
groups. In 1995 this law was modified under Bill Clinton. Expanded in 
2002, George W. Bush further stimulated the issuing of mortgages for mi-
nority groups so they could live the American Dream. However, when 
the circumstances changed, this turned into an American nightmare for 
both home owners and banks.  
Moreover, under the leadership of Alan Greenspan the American central 
bank conducted a far too loose monetary policy with negative long-term 
repercussions. In an effort not to burst the bubble, huge amounts of 
money were pumped into the economy. Some of that money eventually 
made it to the U.S. subprime market. In his focus on the short run, the 
loose money policy seemed like a good idea, but in the long run the 
bounded rationality of this effort had devastating results. Also the Chinese 
policy makers were myopic in systematically keeping the value of their 
currency low. This created a trade surplus in China, which led to an in-
flow of large reserves of U.S. dollars that were subsequently invested in 
U.S. treasuries. This kept American interest rates systematically low, 
thereby reinforcing the loose monetary policy of the U.S. central bank. 
Again, this seemed like a good short-run strategy, but eventually led to a 
destruction of the value of the assets held by China (Schwartz, 2009, 
Kessler, 2010, Bresser-Pereira, 2010). In the Netherlands the importance of 
psychology for the economy was equally overlooked. Prime Minister Bal-
kenende already talked about recession even before there was any eco-
nomic downturn. Such talk about recession helped cause the boundedly 
rational consumers and producers to hold back on their purchases. It is 
therefore not surprising that the American National Bureau of Economic 
Research waits a few quarters before pronouncing on the economic cycle 
(van Ewijk and Teulings, 2009). 
3.2 Markets and the crisis 
Another set of narratives concerning the crisis blames the faulty function-
ing of financial markets. While individuals may in general be rational in 
their economic decision making, and while the market may often be the 
superior mechanism with which to organize the economy, the problem 
was that some institutions had been absent which should not have been 
absent, and that other institutions had not worked the way they should. 
Indeed, the financial system that almost imploded was founded on a belief 
in free markets. The gradual deregulation that started in the United States 
upon the advice of Milton Friedman and others in the 1960’s (e.g. 
MacKenzie, 2006, 2007, Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009, Cassidy, 2009) was based 
on the assumption that markets always produce the highest amount of 
welfare and that any law or other restriction reduced the welfare-creating 
powers of the markets. Also the integration of the European economies 
and the creation of the euro were partly based on the idea of rational 
markets. The belief was that markets in their rationality would judge gov-
ernment bonds of countries with higher current account deficits and 
budget deficits to be riskier than others, and would hence demand a com-
paratively higher interest rate on those bonds. In turn, this would induce 
the governments of those countries to reduce their deficits.  
This belief in the market mechanism was inspired by New Classical mac-
roeconomics, which is closely linked to neoclassical microeconomics. 
Scared by the experience of stagflation in the 1970’s, New Classical econo-
mists embraced an unbridled belief in the rationality of man and the bene-
fits of markets. Policy recommendations focused on structural matters, 
with the expectation of higher economic growth. The fluctuations in the 
economy were taken for granted. Not surprisingly, then, these econo-
mists had not seen the crisis coming (Krugman, 2009, Buiter, 2009, Stiglitz, 
2010).With the credit crunch shattering these beliefs, policy makers en 
masse embraced the earlier maligned insights of John Maynard Keynes 
and thus an active role for fiscal policy in managing the fluctuations in 
the economy.  
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As noted earlier, the crisis erupted during a time in which microeconom-
ics was no longer dominated by one, neoclassical paradigm, but by a plu-
ralism of economic research programs. These research programs offered 
different assessments and suggested different solutions to the crisis. To 
neoclassically minded economists, the market was still the best economic 
system and individuals were on average rational. It was just that a few 
people had been so stupid to take on mortgages they could not afford, 
that some banks had not realized American individuals could simply walk 
away from the house they could no longer pay, and that some countries 
had failed to enact the proper systematic reforms of their economies (Fer-
guson, 2009). The solution, then, was to simply let the crisis do its work to 
teach the economic actors how to be rational (Posner, 2009, Shiller, 2008). 
The crisis, however, showed that markets were unable to contain the 
boundedly rational behavior of individual agents. Agents who had sold 
the mortgages and bankers who had owned them had operated under 
incentive structures that had induced them to take on as much risk as 
possible. Credit rating agencies stimulated unrealistic optimism by giving 
out unrealistically optimistic credit ratings. Shareholders pushed banks to 
go for short-term gains at the expense of long-run financial health. Like-
wise, bonuses focused on the short-run stimulated bankers to take on 
excessive risks, since the potentially high gains were rewarded, while the 
likely losses were not held against them. And banks that did not go along 
with the unrealistic optimism that was sweeping the market were not 
performing as well as those heavily involved in the business of securitiza-
tion. Moreover, banks that were considered too big to fail knew they 
would receive government support if things took a bad turn. 
The problem, then, was that markets were unable to constrain these ex-
cesses. What may have been rational from a short-run, individual perspec-
tive turned out to be boundedly rational from a long-run, societal per-
spective. The contribution of behavioral economics to this narrative is the 
insight that the institutions that had been designed to enable and con-
strain the market’s welfare-increasing mechanism might not always work 
as intended. In the opinion of behavioral economists, we need institutions 
that take into account the bounded rationality of individuals. Moreover, 
the fact that individuals’ behavior deviates systematically and predictably 
from the rational decision, implies that companies can take advantage of 
individuals. For instance, if consumers systematically underestimate the 
number of minutes they are going to use their cell-phones each month, 
cell-phone companies can run a profit by charging a high price for the 
minutes exceeding the number of minutes specified in the contract 
(Grubb, 2006). Consumers will not mind because they do not expect to 
exceed the amount of minutes of their contract, whereas cell-phone 
companies know that on average they will. Another example is the cost of 
cartridges consumers fail to take into account when buying a new printer 
(Epstein, 2006). 
 
4. Behavioral economic lessons 
Behavioral economic solutions to the crisis are still a largely unexplored 
territory. This is partly because there is little attention for the bounded 
rationality of the consumer. After all, it is not possible to get ‘the con-
sumer’ to appear in front of a national committee investigating the causes 
of the crisis. In addition, there are two psychological hurdles to drawing 
lessons from the crisis.  
The first is a combination of the self-serving bias, fundamental attribution 
error, and actor-observer bias. The self-serving bias involves people attrib-
uting their successes to internal or personal factors but attributing their 
failures to situational factors beyond their control (Miller and Ross, 1975). 
If the crisis is beyond one’s control, then there is no need to change one’s 
behavior. The fundamental attribution error involves the tendency to 
over-value dispositional or personality-based explanations for the ob-
served behaviors of others while under-valuing situational explanations 
for those behaviors (Ross, 1977). This explains why we all pointed to the 
bankers as the guys with the bad character traits. At the same time, we 
were reluctant to point to ourselves, which is related to the actor-observer 
bias, which causes us to stress situational factors when considering our 
own behavior (Jones and Nisbett, 1971). As a result of these biases and er-
rors, bankers point their fingers at shareholders, credit-rating agencies, 
and central banks, who in turn point their fingers at policy makers, who 
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in turn point their fingers at bankers. This became painfully clear during 
the hearings of the ‘Commissie-De Wit’ in the Netherlands. And so we 
come full circle without drawing any lessons from the crisis. 
The second is disaster myopia, which refers to the propensity to underes-
timate the probability of adverse outcomes, in particular small probability 
events from the distant past (Guttentag and Herring, 1986). As a result, for 
example, large groups of people choose to travel by car immediately after 
an airplane accident, but happily hop on the plane a year later. With the 
crisis seemingly disappearing rather quickly, the momentum for drawing 
lessons goes away. Thus, never waste a good crisis, but make sure to learn 
from it while you are in the middle of it. With much of fiscal policy fo-
cused on softening the effects of the crisis, the desire to tackle its causes 
evaporates. Worse, the focus subsequently moves to fixing the govern-
ment budget, while myopically ignoring the serious blows it may receive 
in the future. 
Despite these hurdles, it is not too difficult to see what implications derive 
from the behavioral economic position as sketched above. We will intro-
duce what we think could be one promising behavioral economic policy 
proposal that might help prevent future crises. As the crisis started with 
mortgages, our example will also be about mortgages. From a behavioral 
economic perspective, the challenge of the crisis is to preserve what is 
good about the market while simultaneously taking into account the 
bounded rationality of economic actors. To that effect we propose the 
Default mortgage. The Default mortgage is a mortgage of which the con-
tract is determined by the government. One could think of a mortgage 
not exceeding five times annual income before taxes, with a thirty-year 
life span, a fixed interest-rate, a linear repayment of the mortgage in thirty 
years, no backing by securities or bonds, a fixed fee for the agent selling 
the mortgage, and no life-insurance other than that determined by law. 
Of course, there is no such thing as a risk-free mortgage, and the exact 
parameters of the Default mortgage may be altered. Alternatively, one 
could design two or three different Default mortgages. The crucial aspect, 
however, is that the Default mortgages guard the individual as much as 
possible against his or her bounded rationality. In other words, the De-
fault-mortgage is not a solution to an imperfection of the market-system 
– the traditional reason for market intervention – but a solution to the 
bounded rationality of the consumers who operate in the market. As 
such, it derives from behavioral economic insights.  
Once installed, banks and other providers may start offering the Default 
mortgage to consumers, but only under the rules set by the government. 
They compete on the interest rate charged as well as through their gen-
eral service and reputation. In other words, the default mortgages ensures 
that the market can still do its welfare-enhancing work, but at the same 
time guards individuals against their bounded rationality. Mortgage pro-
viders still have an incentive to reduce their costs, so as to be able to re-
duce the interest rates charged, and equally have an incentive to increase 
their service to consumers and their reputation in general. Thus, under 
the Default mortgage, the mortgage-providers are still fully incentivized 
to maximize their profits, but the possibility of taking unfair advantage of 
individuals has been eliminated. 
Another important feature of the market system is the freedom of the 
individual to choose the commodities s/he wants. To ensure the continu-
ity of freedom of choice, we propose that in addition to the default mort-
gage, banks and other providers will be allowed to offer all the different 
types of mortgages as before. Individuals who are willing to take extra risk 
over and above the Default mortgage, or who for whatever reason argue a 
contract outside the default mortgage scheme to be superior, are hence 
free to do so. In that case, however, the responsibility for the contract’s 
parameters rests entirely with the bank and the individual taking the 
mortgage. Of course, the costs of the continuity of a maximum freedom 
of choice is that some boundedly rational individuals who should opt for 
the Default mortgage are lured into taking a mortgage outside the De-
fault mortgage scheme. After all, some individuals are more aware of their 
bounded rationality than others. To minimize this cost the government 
could start a campaign promoting the default mortgage, require all mort-
gage providers to at least propose the default mortgage, or install some 
other form of discouragement.  
Thus instituted, the default mortgage improves the functioning of the 
market system in a number of ways. First of all, it assures that firms can-
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not take advantage of individuals’ bounded rationality. This will increase 
the welfare of the individuals and marginally reduces the welfare of the 
banks issuing the mortgages. Hence, it increases the welfare created by the 
market. Second, it forces the banks and other providers to compete on 
interest rates and service, instead of on the mortgage contract that most 
disguises the true risks and costs. Third, despite its constraint on how the 
market operates, the Default mortgage ensures the freedom of choice. 
And last but not least, although zero risk is impossible, the Default mort-
gage scheme reduces the chance of a new mortgage-driven financial crisis.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Behavioral economics is one of the most prominent new research pro-
grams that have largely replaced the formerly dominant neoclassical 
paradigm. As the financial system that came tumbling down in 2008 was 
constructed on the basis of the neoclassical theories it is no more than 
natural to look at behavioral economics as one of neoclassical economics’ 
contestants for answers to the crisis. From an economic perspective, the 
problem is that human self-interest – if not greed – provides the basis for 
the functioning of the market system but at the same time seeks to de-
stroy the market system that allows it to flourish. The financial and eco-
nomic crisis has once again emphasized that we need institutions that 
both allow and constrain the pursuit of human self-interest. This puzzle is 
further complicated by the only boundedly rational capacities of many, if 
not all of the consumers, managers, policy makers and so on who to-
gether make up the economy. 
An example of such a post-crisis institution, inspired by behavioral eco-
nomics, is the Default mortgage. The essence of the Default mortgage is 
that it specifies in which domains the self-interested market actors are 
allowed to pursue their self-interest, and in which domains they are not 
allowed to do so. As such, the Default both guards boundedly rational 
individuals against their limited capacities, while at the same time main-
taining, if not enhancing, the welfare-producing capacities of the market.  
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